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Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Continued Shrinking
of Private-Plaintiff Remedies Under The 1933
Securities Act
LEGISLATION is not anticipation. It is a response, too often a
laggard response, to serious need. The new Federal Securities
Act is a belated and conservative attempt to curb the recurrence
of old abuses which, through failure of adequate legislation, had
attained disastrous proportions. How to draw the savings of
people into great streams of investment and at the same time to
protect those savings from recklessness has been a problem for
statesmanship ever since the advent of large corporate
enterprise. Particularly exigent has this problem been in periods
of crisis following speculative debauches. Man's memory is
short and hope of gain is an obdurate motive. When, however,
confidence takes flight, it can be coaxed to return permanently
only by prudent safeguards against future devastation.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As a response to the 1929 Stock Market crash, securities2 are now
1. Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: H1, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53. See
infra part II (discussing the background of the 1933 Securities Act).
2. Congress defined a "security" in the definitional provision of the Securities Act of
1933 (the "1933 Act"). Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994)). Section 2(1), as amended in 1934, provides:
(I) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881, 905 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994)). In 1982, Congress inserted the following
language into 15 U.S.C. § 77b, after "mineral rights": "any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency .... " An Act of October 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994)). This definition allows for "sufficiently broad
and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), reprinted in I FED. BAR ASS'N SECURmEs LAWS
149
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
regulated by legislation at both the state and federal level. The sale of
stock4 often occurs after the distribution of a prospectus to the public,
offering information about the stock and the entity issuing the stock.'
Generally, a prospectus is a selling document or advertisement,
usually for the sale of a security, which provides information about
that security and the company issuing the security.' Securities laws,
however, offer a more precise meaning of the term "prospectus".
Specifically, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") 7 defines the
term "prospectus" in the definitional section of the Act.' Section 2(10)
provides: "'prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, adver-
tisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television,
which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any
security," unless the context provides otherwise. 9
Federal appellate courts, however, differed in their interpretation of
the proper scope of this definition in other provisions of the 1933
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 148 (1983).
3. Basically, these laws "reflect the regulatory procedures required to be followed by a
company seeking to raise funds from both public and private sources." WILLIAM M.
PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 1:01 (1994). For a discussion of the
beginnings of security regulation at the federal level, see infra part 11.
4. The following general scenario depicts the way in which securities are often sold
to the public:
In a typical ... public offering, the marketing of securities occurs much as the
marketing of most consumer products. The securities are created by the issuer
(the manufacturer), which sells them to "underwriters" (wholesalers), which in
turn sell them to "dealers" (retailers), which then sell them to investor-
shareholders (consumers). The process of getting securities from the issuer to
the investing pubic is known as a public distribution.
LEwIs D. SOLOMON AND ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS
§ 10.1.1 (2d ed. 1994).
5. Perhaps the best way to define a public offering is through negative inference,
defining first a private offering, and then noting that "[a] private offering is the
opposite of a public offering." PRIFrl, supra note 3, § 1:07. The Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") limits private offerings by the number of participants that may be
involved, but generally does not limit the amount of money that may be raised. Id. See
also Regulation D of the 1933 Act, Sec. Act. Rel. No. 6389 (March 8, 1982) (establish-
ing safe-harbor exemptions for certain qualifying transactions). In addition, § 4(2) of
the 1933 Act exempts private offerings from many of the requirements of the Act itself.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
In contrast to private offerings, in which the sale of securities occurs through a private
agreement, a public offering is commonly accomplished through the use of securities
exchanges, or through broker-dealer relationships. PRIFrI, supra note 3, § 1:06.
6. A prospectus is "a description of a new security issue supplied to prospective
purchasers." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1821 (1986). See infra
note 122.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
9. Id.
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Act.' ° When the sale of stock is accomplished through the use of a
prospectus, section 12(2) of the Act provides the buyers with an ex-
press cause of action for rescission of the sale when the sellers make
material misstatements or omissions in the prospectus." Disagreement
on the meaning and scope of the term "prospectus" in section 12(2) led
to a circuit split.'2 Specifically, the courts could not agree on whether
section 12(2) applied to aftermarket or secondary market trans-
actions."s
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 14 the Supreme Court resolved this
circuit split, deciding in a five to four ruling that the term "prospectus"
as used in section 12(2) does not apply to a private agreement for the
sale of securities." The Court therefore held that no cause of action
10. While § 2(10) provides the general definition of the term prospectus, courts
disagreed on the meaning of prospectus as used in § 12(2), in light of the restrictive
definition of prospectus in § 10. See infra notes 31-62 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the courts' concerns with this contradictory language.
I 1. Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of [section 3], other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). Professor Louis Loss once noted that since "[s]ection 12(2)
is not too happily drafted .... it is best not to attempt a paraphrase." 3 Louis Loss,
SECURmES REGULATION 1699 (2d ed. 1961).
1 2. For a complete discussion on the nature of this circuit split, see infra part 11.
13. It is undisputed that when an issuer makes an initial distribution or an offering of
a security, the issuer can be subject to liability under § 12(2). Catherine Zucal,
Comment, Does Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 Apply to Secondary
Trading?: Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Waler, Inc., 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1179 (1991)
(citing Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 131 F.R.D. 118, 126 (N.D. III. 1990)). These transactions
generate proceeds for corporate use. 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6.03 (1988). In comparison, a secondary market
transaction, broadly defined, is made on behalf of some person or company other than
the original issuer. Id. Additionally, the notion of a secondary market transaction can
refer to a control person's sale of securities. See generally RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 469-491 (7th ed. 1992) (defining aftermarket transactions).
14. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
15. Id. at 1073-74. See infra part III.C for a discussion of the Court's holding.
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exists for misrepresentations made in such contracts under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act. 6
This Note first traces the background of the federal securities laws
and the posture of the circuits prior to the decision in Gustafson.17
This Note then discusses the majority and dissenting opinions in
Gustafson.18 Next, this Note analyzes the decision in Gustafson,
concluding that the majority unnecessarily considered factors outside
the statute, rather than looking at the plain language of the statute
itself.'9 Finally, this Note anticipates that Gustafson will limit the
rights of private parties involved in securities trading that seek
remedies under the 1933 Act.2"
I. BACKGROUND
The Great Depression began on Black Monday, October 29, 1929.
The crash of the stock market in New York not only signaled the
beginning of the Great Depression, but also marked the impetus for the
development of the federal securities laws. 21 The devastating impact
of the stock market crash highlighted the need for change. In response
to the financial crash, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted a
program to return stability to the American economic system, with
considerable focus on stock markets, the issuance of securities, and
securities trading. To achieve stability, Congress enacted the
Securities Act of 1933.23 This new legislation, President Roosevelt
stressed, would ensure that "every issue of new securities ... [would]
be accompanied by full publicity and information" with the burden of
truthful disclosure on those that issued securities. 24 The 1933 Act
protected the public through disclosure requirements and created
remedies for violations of the Act.25
16. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
17. See infra part II.
18. See infra part III.
19. See infra part lV.
20. See infra part V.
21. Arthur H. Dean, The Federal Securities Act: 1, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 50 (1933).
"[Wihen President Roosevelt signed . . . [the 1933 Act], he not only put an end to a
series of promotional practices which had played their part in precipitating the Stock
Market Crash of 1929: he altered the whole technique of American finance." Id.
22. President's [Roosevelt] Message to Congress, 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933),
reprinted in I FED. BAR Ass'N, SEC. L. COMM., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1933-1982, at 20 (1983) [hereinafter President's Message].
23. Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have it Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies
Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. LAW. 1, 8 (1992).
24. President's Message, supra note 22.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1994).
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One of these remedies can be found in section 12(2).26 Section
12(2) creates civil liability when the seller of a security makes a mis-
representation in the offering of that security." The scope of this
section, however, remained undefined and in flux. 28  Legislative
history on the provision was "sparse," shedding little light on the
intended scope of section 12(2).29 Specifically, scholars 30 and courts3'
questioned whether section 12(2) could be applied to transactions other
than initial offerings. Federal district courts also disagreed on the
scope of section 12(2), with some courts finding that this section ap-
plied to secondary market transactions,32 and other courts holding that
26. See supra note 11 for the text of § 12(2). Damages and rescission are available
under § 12(2) where a purchaser can establish that the seller:
(1) offered to sell or sold a security, (2) through the use of interstate
commerce, (3) by means of a prospectus or oral communication, (4) which
included a misstatement or omission of material fact, (5) of which the
purchaser did not have knowledge, unless the seller did not know nor could
reasonably have known of the misstatement or omission.
Kevin N. Peter, Comment, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: Does it Apply to
the Secondary Market? The Circuits are Fighting, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (1994);
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). See supra note 11. Section 12(2) provides an express
private right of action, unlike some of the other statutory provisions. Compare § 12(2)
(providing an express private right of action) with § 17 (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)) (failing to
explictly create a private right of action). For the text of § 17, see infra note 125.
28. See infra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
29. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657 (1986). For an extended discussion
on the legislative history of the 1933 Act, see James M. Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959). Significantly,
Congress has not, to this date, substantively amended § 12. Adam D. Hirsch, Comment,
Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 955, 965, 984 (1990).
30. See generally Hirsch, supra note 29, at 984 (arguing that § 12(2) should apply to
an aftermarket only where that market is inefficient); Louis Loss, The Assault on
Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 917 (1992) (arguing that § 12(2)
applies to the sale of all securities); Louis Loss, Securities Act Section 12(2): A
Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAW. 47 (1992) (finding that public policy supports the application
of § 12(2) to private transactions); Therese H. Maynard, The Future of Securities Act
Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. REV. 817, 822 (1994) (arguing that the general understanding
of § 12(2) requires its application to secondary market transactions); Therese H.
Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent
Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 849 (1991)
(concluding that a "§ 12(2) cause of action is available to any defrauded buyer"); Peter,
supra note 26 (examining the circuit split prior to Gustafson and advocating a broad in-
terpretation of § 12(2)); Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for Wrongs in the
Secondary Market?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 97, 140 (1991) (supporting a limitation of § 12(2)
to initial offerings); Weiss, supra note 23, at 4 (arguing that the language "by means of
a prospectus" was intended to limit the scope of § 12(2)).
3 1. See generally Peter, supra note 26, at 1206-07 n.9 (citing cases holding either
that §12(2) applied or did not apply to secondary market transactions).
32. The following district courts held that § 12(2) applied to secondary market
19951
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section 12(2) had no such application. 33 Four appellate courts decid-
ing this issue similarly disagreed on the proper interpretation of the
term "prospectus" in section 12(2).34 By 1993, a circuit court split had
developed.
Decisions by the Third and Seventh Circuits exemplified this split.
In Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,3 the Third Circuit
expressly considered the application of section 12(2) to a privately
negotiated sale of stock. In Ballay, investors sued a brokerage firm
for alleged oral misrepresentations made regarding the value of the
securities at issue.36 Plaintiffs prevailed on the section 12(2) claim
against the brokerage firm, but the district court certified for appeal the
issue of whether section 12(2) applied to secondary market trans-
actions.
37
transactions: Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 750 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); In re Ramtek Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,483 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1990); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., No. 88-
6867, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15495, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1989), rev'd, 925 F.2d
682, 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991); Elysian Fed. Say. Bank v. First
Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737, 747-51 (D.N.J. 1989); Scotch v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 95, 98 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
For an explanation of secondary market transactions, see supra note 13.
33. However, significantly more district courts have held that § 12(2) did not apply
to secondary market transactions: Cox v. Eichler, 765 F. Supp. 601, 609 (N.D. Cal.
1990); T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Md.
1990); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 744 F. Supp. 931, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Leonard v. Stuart-James Co., 742 F. Supp. 653, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Mix v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 1989); Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F. Supp. 1228,
1232-33 (D.N.J. 1989); Cheltenham Bank v. Drexel Burham Lambert Inc., [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,391, at 92,542 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 15.,
1989); Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ralph v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1988); SSH Co. v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
34. First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-844 (11th
Cir. 1993); Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 907, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); Metromedia
Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993);
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991). See infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these decisions.
35. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991).
36. Id. at 686. The Ballay court explained that the broker, Legg Mason, calculated
security values in order to promote investment in undervalued securities. Id. at 685. The
brokerage firm operated on the "value philosophy of investing" which sought to
purchase securities from bankrupt or reorganized companies which theoretically
presented only limited risks for the investors. Id. The brokerage firm determined the
value of these securities by weighing various characteristics. Id.
37. Id. at 687. See also Zucal, supra note 13 (suggesting that the express language of
§ 12(2) and the legislative intent for the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts contradict the
court's narrow interpretation of the acts in Ballay).
1995] Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
The Ballay court began its analysis of the issue with the language of
section 12(2) and consideration of the doctrine of noscitur a sociiS, 38
which holds that a "word is known by the company it keeps. 39
Applying this doctrine, the court found that the term "oral communi-
cation" in section 12(2) must be considered in relation to other words
that accompanied it.4" The Ballay court reasoned that the term
"prospectus" restricted the definition of "oral communication".
Similarly, the Ballay court found that various provisions of the 1933
Act, notably section 10, limited the scope of the term "prospectus".42
Consequently, the court concluded that the phrase "oral communi-
cation" applied only to the sale of a security in an initial distribution.43
The Ballay court next examined the purpose of the 1933 Act, find-
ing that the goal of the 1933 Act also governed its interpretation of
section 12(2). 44 The Ballay court reasoned that based on Congress'
intent in enacting the Securities Act, only initial offerings of securities
38. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 689-90.
39. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995). See infra notes 120-24
and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.
40. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 687. For the text of § 12(2), see supra note 11.
41. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
42. Id. Specifically, the Ballay court stated: "[i]n addition to its definition, the use
of the term "prospectus" in various sections of the 1933 Act supports a reading restricted
to initial distributions." Id.
The Ballay court heavily relied on § 10 of the 1933 Act in making this assertion. Id.
Section 10 sets forth the information required in a prospectus. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
Section 10 of the 1933 Act provides:
Except to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this
subsection or subsections (c), (d), or (e) of this section-
(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a
foreign government or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the
information contained in the registration statement ....
(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or
political subdivision thereof shall contain the information contained in the
registration statement ....
Id. Most importantly, a prospectus under § 10 contains essentially the same informa-
tion as required in a registration statement under § 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994) and
compare with 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) (referencing the registration information
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 77a(a) (1994)). However, a prospectus under § 10 may
"omit some documents required of registration statements." Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(i) (1994)). The Ballay court explained its restrictive
reading by stating that "Congress repeatedly used the term 'prospectus' in provisions
concerning registration statement requirements in initial distributions." Ballay, 925
F.2d at 689.
43. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688-89. In reaching this conclusion, the Ballay court noted
that the 1933 Act did not provide a definition for the phrase "oral communication." Id.
at 688. However, the Ballay court readily limited the phrase "oral communication" to
those oral communications "related to a prospectus or initial offering." Id.
44. Id. at 690.
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were to be regulated under the 1933 Act,45 and that section 12(2) there-
fore did not apply to secondary transactions.46
In reaching this conclusion, the Ballay court also relied on public
policy.47 The Ballay court considered the potential conflict with other
statutes that could result from the application of section 12(2) to
secondary market transactions.48 Specifically, the Ballay court noted
the different damage provisions of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ("1934 Act"), which
allows recovery for fraud occurring in both initial and secondary secu-
rities transactions.49 The court found that because section 12(2) of the
1933 Act allows a much greater remedy than section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, the application of section 12(2) should necessarily be more limited
in its scope than section 10(b), and should be applied only to misrepre-
sentations made in initial offerings of securities.'
45. Id. at 691. The Ballay court went on to distinguish other provisions of the 1933
Act, namely § 17, as well as the antifraud remedies of the 1934 Act. Id. at 691-94. The
court determined that "the language and legislative history of § 12(2), as well as its
relationships to §§ 17(a) and 10(b) within the scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
compel our conclusion that § 12(2) applies only to initial offerings and not to
aftermarket trading." Id. at 693.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 692-93. The Ballay court based much of this policy discussion on the
distinctions between § 12(2) of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Id. See infra notes 48-50.
48. The Ballay court expressed concern over the conflicts that could potentially arise
from the application of § 12(2) to secondary market transactions at the same time that §
10(b) of the 1934 Act could be applied, since the two provisions require different
elements of proof and allow different remedies. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692-93. See infra
note 49. The court explained that "the application of § 12(2) to secondary trading would
permit purchasers of securities to prevail against sellers in instances where those
purchasers cannot recover under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692. The court noted that such an interpretation "would effectively
eliminate the use of section 10(b) by securities purchasers." Id. (footnote omitted).
49. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692-93. Section 12(2) allows for rescission, often viewed as
necessary to compensate for fraud in initial security distributions. Id. at 693. On the
other hand, § 10(b) allows for the recovery of only actual damages. Id. The Ballay court
reasoned that these two different remedies were particularly based on the type of
transaction involved. Id. See supra note 48.
In contrast to § 12(2), § 10(b) requires that a private plaintiff prove scienter, reliance,
and causation in order to recover for fraud arising from a secondary market transaction.
Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692-93 (construing § 10(b) cause of actions). See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Common law fraud actions also require that a plaintiff
prove scienter, or "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Id. at 193. See also Peter, supra note 26, at 1208-09 (comparing the different burdens of
proof under §10(b) of the 1934 Act and § 12(2) of the 1933 Act).
50. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693. The court noted that purchasers of securities during the
initial distribution should be allowed to recover the full measure of damages for any
misrepresentations, because the sellers "are the investors' sole source of information
regarding the value of the security." Id. The court contrasted such purchases with
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
Thereafter, many district courts followed Ballay's lead.5' Notably,
while in their decisions the courts expressed agreement with the basic
principles articulated in Ballay, the courts did not expand upon the
rationale for their holdings.
The Seventh Circuit, however, departed from the prevailing view
expressed in Ballay. In Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen &
Co.,52 the court held that the language of section 12(2) indicated that
the provision should be applied to all sales of securities. In Pacific
Dunlop, the plaintiff, through a private stock purchase agreement,
bought stock from a company controlled largely by the defendant, an
investment banking firm. 3 The stock purchase agreement contained
warranties and representations regarding the truth of information
contained in the registration statement filed with the SEC, including
assertions that the company complied with environmental regulations
and had no undisclosed liabilities or obligations. 4 After purchasing
the stock, the plaintiff discovered a multitude of claims against the
company.55 In its lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
omitted material facts from the stock purchase agreement, which
resulted in false representations in violation of section 12(2).56
In deciding whether the stock purchase agreement constituted a
prospectus under section 12(2), the Pacific Dunlop court rejected the
aftermarket transactions, where the investors can learn of the value of the securities
through other sources. Id.
5 1. See, e.g., Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. v. Kapoor, 814 F. Supp. 720, 728 (N.D.
Ill. 1993); Bogart v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 91 Civ. 1036 (LBS), (NG), 1993 WL
33643, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1993); Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. Hirsch, 810
F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432, 435
(N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del. 1992);
Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1513, 1524-25 (D. Or. 1992);
Bennett v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 561 (D.S.C. 1992); Bank of Denver v.
Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (D. Colo. 1991).
52. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 907, cert. dismissed, 114
S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
53. Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc., v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 579 (7th. Cir.
1993). The facts leading up to this private sale of stock are somewhat unique. The stock
that the plaintiff purchased had originally been marked common stock for sale in an ini-
tial public offering. Id. Before any sale pursuant to this initial public offering, plaintiff
and defendant entered into the private stock purchase agreement. Id. There-after, the
issuing company abandoned the initial offering shortly after filing its registration
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission. Id.
54. ld.
55. Id. The company faced claims regarding its compliance with environmental
regulations, government service contracts the gompany had entered into and
occupational disease claims. Id.
56. Id.
1995] 157
158 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
Third Circuit's holding in Ballay The court traced several cases in
an effort to show Ballay's departure from accepted understanding of
the scope of section 12(2).58 The Pacific Dunlop court reasoned that
the inclusion of the term "communication" in section 2(10) of the 1933
Act (defining the term "prospectus") connoted that "prospectus" was to
be interpreted "very broadly," necessarily including all written commu-
nications.5 9 By viewing "prospectus" as a broad, encompassing term,
the Pacific Dunlop court found the misrepresentations in the stock
purchase agreement to be actionable under section 12(2).60 The
Seventh Circuit thus held that section 12(2)'s right of action for
rescission "applie[d] to any communication which offers any security
for sale . . . including the stock purchase agreement in the present
57. Id. at 582. The Pacific Dunlop court devoted an entire section of its opinion to
the "conflict of authority" on the issue of whether the term "prospectus" can include a
stock purchase agreement, subjecting a transaction to liability under § 12(2). Id. at 580-
82. For an extensive discussion of the contrast between Ballay and Pacific Dunlop, see
Therese H. Maynard, Section 12(2)'s Availability to the Defrauded Secondary Market
Buyer, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1993, at 21.
58. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 580-82. First, the Pacific Dunlop court noted that
while the Supreme Court had yet to address the issue of whether § 12(2) applied solely to
initial offerings of stock, the Supreme Court had assumed the opposite in Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez De Quiras v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). In Wilko, the Supreme Court "held that an
arbitration agreement could not waive the provisions" set forth in § 12(2) of the 1933
Act. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. Discussing the facts of the case, the Wilko court
compared initial offerings and aftermarket sales of stock. Id. at 435. The Wilko court,
in dicta, recognized that § 12(2) applied to dealers and brokers, therefore impliedly
recognizing that § 12(2) applied to secondary market transactions. Id. at 430.
Next, the Seventh Circuit found support for its holding in Woodward v. Wright, 266
F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959). The Woodward court held: "the [slection [12(2)] remedy is
applicable to the sale of all securities (with exceptions not here material) whether
exempt from the registration requirements or not, or whether the sellers were issuers for
the purpose of public offering or not." Id. at 116.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the Ballay decision contradicted the First
Circuit in Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 989 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705
(1940). In Cady, the court held that § 12(2) could apply to securities not required to be
registered and that liability could be imposed "for misrepresentations not only upon
principals but also upon brokers when selling securities owned by other persons." Id. at
990. Again, while the First Circuit did not expressly address whether § 12(2) applied
only to initial distributions, its choice of language indicates that § 12(2) could apply to
secondary market transactions. Id.
59. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582. The Seventh Circuit in Pacific Dunlop began its
analysis of the issue with the text of the statute itself. Id. at 582. The Court noted that
the term "prospectus" was defined broadly, as are other words used in § 12(2). Id. The
Court rationalized that nothing in § 12(2) or elsewhere in the Act required a narrow
reading of the term "prospectus." Id. at 587-88. Specifically, in reviewing the
definitional section for "prospectus", the Court stated that "[slection 2(10) is broad
enough to include initial and secondary market transactions." Id. at 588.
60. Id. at 595.
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case."
61
The Second and Eleventh Circuits both followed Ballay without ex-
planation.62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pacific Dunlop 63
in order to resolve the split. However, the parties settled and certiorari
was dismissed.6' The Court then granted certiorari in Gustafson.65
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of the Case
In 1989, Arthur L. Gustafson, Daniel R. McLean and Francis I.
Butler (collectively "Sellers"), the sole shareholders of Alloyd Co.,
Inc., decided to sell their company to Wind Point Partners II, L.P.
("Wind Point") ( the "Buyers"). 66 Wind Point, in making its decision
to purchase Alloyd, relied on a formal business review of the company
conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick ("KPMG"). 6' As part of this
business review, KPMG reviewed the financial statements of Alloyd,
61. Id.
62. First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44
(I Ith Cir. 1993); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert denied,
113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993). In First Union, investors counterclaimed in an action against a
discount broker for material false misrepresentations, in connection with transactions
that occurred in the week prior to the October 1987 stock market crash. First Union,
997 F.2d at 837-41. After summarizing the Ballay reasoning and opinion, the First
Union court stated that: "we are persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning and hold that
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions." Id. at 843-44
(footnote omitted).
The Metromedia court did not cite specifically to Ballay. However, the Metromedia
court followed Ballay to the extent that Ballay held that oral communications relating to
a prospectus or initial distribution could be actionable under § 12(2). Metromedia, 983
F.2d at 361. The Metromedia court noted that "[i]n order to prevail on a claim under §
12(2) for a sale based on an oral communication, a purchaser of securities must show that
the communication was 'intended or perceived as instrumental in effecting the sale'." Id.
(quoting Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 830 n.8 (2d. Cir. 1976)). The facts of
Metromedia include misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in connection
with the issuance of stock. Id. at 356. Therefore, the posture of this case is different
from those cases analyzing § 12(2) in light of the secondary market transaction.
63. 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
64. 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
65. 114 S. Ct. 1215 (1994).
66. Importantly, the Respondent's Brief noted that no evidence existed showing any
previous sale or distribution of Alloyd's stock to any person before the stock sale to
Wind Point. Brief for Respondent at *2, Gustafson, 115 S. Ct 1061 (1995) (No. 93-
404), 1994 WL 328995 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. However, because of the
Sellers' status as controlling shareholders, the courts characterized the transaction as a
secondary market transaction. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1065 (1995).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
67. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
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noting that the inventory listing reflected only an estimate because
Alloyd normally took inventory at the end of the year.68 In determin-
ing the purchase price, the Sellers relied on these estimates and in-
cluded a provision in the contract which allowed for adjustments to the
price after the sale if the actual value of the inventory differed from the
estimates.6 9
The Buyers purchased all of Alloyd's outstanding stock through a
private stock purchase agreement ("Agreement").70 The Agreement
contained several warranties and representations. 7' The Agreement
also provided that if the year-end audit revealed a discrepancy between
estimated and actual increase in net worth, remuneration for that vari-
ance would be made. 72 Shortly thereafter, the year-end audit revealed
a discrepancy between the estimated and actual earnings. 3 The Sellers
overestimated the 1989 earnings by $815,000.00, which they
refunded to the Buyers, with interest, pursuant to the adjustment
clause in the Agreement. 74
Despite receiving full compensation for paying more than the actual
value of the securities, the Buyers filed suit. They contended that the
Sellers made misrepresentations regarding inventory and interim actual
earnings, in violation of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.75 The lawsuit
68. Id. at 1065.
69. Id.
70. Id.
7 1. Id. The representations and warranties were included in Article IV of the stock
purchase agreement "[a]s an inducement to Buyer to enter into this Agreement."
Respondent's Brief, supra note 66, at *4 (citing Joint Appendix, at *111). Sellers
represented to the Buyer that:
(1) the financial statements provided to Holdings, including the Latest
Balance Sheet, "present fairly on a consolidated basis the Company's
financial condition and related results of operations as of the times and for the
periods referred to therein." (J. A. 115 at P 4D);
(2) between the date of the Latest Balance Sheet and the date of the Stock
Purchase Agreement, there were no material adverse changes in "the business,
financial condition, operating results, assets, operations or business
prospects" of Alloyd (J.A. 117 at P 41); and
(3) Sellers had not failed to disclose any material facts that would adversely
affect Alloyd's "business, financial condition, operating results, assets,
operations or business prospects" (J.A. 140 at P 47).
Id. at *4-*5.
72. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065. Specifically, "[tihe contract also provided that if
the year-end audit and financial statements revealed a variance between estimated and
actual increased value, the disappointed party would receive an adjustment." Id. For a
discussion of the potential effect of this provision, see infra part IV.C.
73. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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sought rescission of the Agreement pursuant to section 12(2).76
B. Opinions Below
The District Court, relying on Ballay, granted Sellers' motion for
summary judgment.77 The court held that section 12(2) claims may
arise only out of initial stock offerings, and not privately negotiated
transactions.78 The court explained that unlike transactions occurring
during initial offerings, the Buyers had access to financial information
regarding Alloyd.79 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case for additional consideration in view of its
own intervening decision in Pacific Dunlop. 80
After dismissing certiorari in Pacific Dunlop,8 the Supreme Court
swiftly granted certiorari in Gustafson8 2 in order to resolve the split
among the circuits regarding the proper application of section 12(2).83
76. Id. The Buyers asserted two claims in their complaint. First, Buyers alleged a
violation of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Respondent's Brief, supra note 66, at *5-6.
Second, Buyers alleged a breach of the representations and warranties contained in the
Agreement. Id.
77. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065. The Ballay court held that § 12(2) only applied to
initial offerings. See supra part II for a discussion of Ballay.
78. The dismissal of the plaintiff's § 12(2) claim took place in an unreported
disposition by Judge Williams of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in
1992. Gustafson, No. 91C889, Memorandum Opinion and Order (N.D. Ill. May 29,
1992). Judge Williams noted that "[wihile plaintiffs suggest that ... [the language of §
12(2)] supports their argument that Section 12(2) is applicable, they have provided...
no evidence to support their claim that the sale at issue possesses the characteristics of a
new offering." Id. at 12.
79. Id. Judge Williams remarked that "the transaction at issue in this case occurred
approximately 30 years after the initial issuance of Alloyd's stock. Also, unlike
purchasers in most initial offerings, the purchasers in this case had direct access to
financial and other company documents, and had the opportunity to inspect the seller's
property." Id. (citation omitted).
80 Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Pacific Dunlop.
81. 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994). See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this dismissal.
82. 114 S. Ct. 1215 (1994). For an analysis of this swift grant of certiorari, see
Therese H. Maynard, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Supreme Court to Decide a Section
12(2) Case, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1994, at 33 Opining on the focus the Court would adopt in
deciding the case, Maynard notes:
By promptly granting review to Gustafson, the Court is seizing a second
chance to review the Seventh Circuit's broader analysis of the scope of
Section 12(2) relief as reflected in its Pacific Dunlop ruling. Moreover, by
plucking the unreported case of Gustafson from relative obscurity and agreeing
to review it[,] ... the Court seems anxious to reach the broader question of the
availability of Section 12(2).
Id.
83. For a discussion of the circuit split, see supra notes 31-62 and accompanying
1995]
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The Court clearly demonstrated its concern with this issue when,
after the parties and several amici curiae submitted briefs,84 the Court
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of "whether
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act applies to secondary transactions as
well as to initial offerings of securities."85 The Supreme Court, in a
five to four decision, held that section 12(2) does not apply to second-
ary transactions.86 The Court's decision sent shocks to the field of
securities law.87
C. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Prior to beginning its analysis of the case, the Court stated that it
would assume "that the stock purchase agreement contained material
misstatements of fact made by the Sellers and that Gustafson would
not sustain its burden of proving due care. ' '88 The Buyers would
therefore be entitled to rescission under section 12(2) if the Agreement
fell within the scope of the statute. 89 The Supreme Court articulated
the specific issue presented as: "whether the contract between Alloyd
and Gustafson is a 'prospectus' as the term is used in the 1933 Act."9
text.
84. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. ("SIA") in Support of
Petitioners [Sellers], Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995) (No. 93-404)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, SCT PLUS file) [hereinafter SIA's Amicus Curiae Brief]; Brief of
Amicus Curiae National Associations of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys in
Support of Respondents [Buyers], Gustafson (No. 93-404) (LEXIS, Genfed library, SCT
PLUS file); Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of
Respondents [Buyers], Gustafson (No. 93-404) (LEXIS, Genfed library, SCT PLUS file);
Brief of Amicus Curiae North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. in
Support of Respondents [Buyers], Gustafson (No. 93-404) (LEXIS, Genfed library, SCT
PLUS file).
85. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. 32 (1994). The Court gave no explanation for this request.
Id. Also, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented from the entry of the order. Id.
86. Id. at 1074.
87. See Supreme Court's Definition of "Prospectus" Favours Rule 144A Market, FIN.
REG. REP., Mar., 1995; Supreme Court Settles Securities Law, VENTURE CAPITAL J., Apr.,
1995; Rob Wells, Supreme Court Decisions Make Major Strides in Litigation Reform,
J. REC. (Oklahoma City) (Mar. 4, 1995); Supreme Court Limits Liability in Private
Securities Sales, LIABILITY WK., Mar. 6, 1995. See infra part V for a discussion of the
impact of Gustafson.
88. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
89. Id. With this assumption, the Court effectively narrowed the issue. See generally
Maynard, supra note 82, at 33 (concluding that the Supreme Court should use the
Gustafson appeal to confront the question of the scope of § 12(2), and to resolve future
controversies under this section by defining the elements needed for a plaintiff-
purchaser to prevail on a § 12(2) claim).
90. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066. See supra notes 71- 72 and accompanying text for
the language of the contract.
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The Buyers argued that the broad definition of "prospectus" encom-
passed the contract between the parties, entitling them to seek rescis-
sion under section 12(2) for material misrepresentations contained in
the Agreement. 9' In contrast, Sellers argued that the 1933 Act limited
the term "prospectus" to mean only "a communication soliciting the
public to purchase securities from the seller."92
The Court found three sections of the 1933 Act to be relevant to the
resolution of the issue at hand: (1) section 2(10), which defines the
term "prospectus"; (2) section 10, which outlines the information
which must be in a prospectus, and (3) section 12, which creates a
cause of action for misrepresentations contained in a prospectus.93
The Court began its analysis with section 10 of the 1933 Act, which
requires that a prospectus contain the same information that must also
be included in a registration statement. 94 The Court explained that
although section 10 does not define prospectus, it is still instructive,
because it illustrates when a document cannot be considered a
91. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066. The Buyers based their arguments on the
expansive scope and nature of the entire 1933 Act. See Respondent's Brief, supra note
66, at *9. They relied on a straightforward reading of § 12(2), arguing that the remedial
purpose of the Act required the application of § 12(2) to a private sale of stock. Id. at
*10. The Buyers asserted that "[tihe Act ... does not draw distinctions between 'public'
and 'private' purchasers when providing remedies for false or misleading statements of
material fact." Id. Furthermore, the Buyers explained that the SEC construed § 12(2) to
apply to private sales transactions. Id. Therefore, "[g]iven this consistent construction
by the courts of appeals and the agency responsible for administering the Act, the
narrow construction of section 12(2) urged by Sellers would upset the justified
expectations of the legal and investment communities." Id. The Court noted that the
dissents of Justices Thomas and Ginsburg supported these arguments. Gustafson, 115 S.
Ct. at 1066. For a discussion of the dissents, see infra part III.D.
92. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066. The Sellers relied on specific provisions of the
1933 Act and the complex interplay between the provisions of both the 1933 and 1934
Acts as the bases for their arguments. See Brief for Petitioner at *8, Gustafson, 115 S.
Ct. 1061 (1995), 1994 WL 178124 [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. The Sellers also
argued that legislative history supported a narrow construction of § 12(2). Id. at *10-
* 11. The Sellers maintained that because the Buyers were sophisticated and had
sufficient bargaining power, the rescissionary relief available under § 12(2) would be
improper. Id. at *8-*9.
93. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
94. Id.; see supra note 42. While the meaning of a prospectus under § 10 was not
disputed by the courts, the courts disagreed about the implications of § 10 relating to the
scope of § 12(2). Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. The relationship between
"prospectus" as used in § 10 and in § 12(2) was contemplated by both Ballay and Pacific
Dunlop. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688-89 (submitting that "prospectus" has a consistent
meaning in both sections), and Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 588 (rejecting the notion of
a uniform definition of "prospectus" throughout the Act). In fact, in Pacific Dunlop, the
court noted that § 10 contemplates a "prospectus" as "an isolated, distinct document-a
prospectus within a prospectus." Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d. at 584.
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prospectus." The Court further noted that section 12(2) must be
considered in light of section 10 in order to promote a uniform inter-
pretation of "prospectus" throughout the Act.'
Based upon this reasoning, the Court in Gustafson found that the
agreement at issue could not be considered a prospectus under section
10, because the law does not require such contracts to contain all infor-
mation found in a registration statement.97 The Court stressed that
"whatever else 'prospectus' may mean, the term is confined to a docu-
ment that, absent an overriding exemption, must include the 'infor-
mation contained in the registration statement."' 98 The Court noted
that, generally, the preparation and filing of a registration statement is
required only for a public offering of a security.99 The Court then
observed that "a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents
relating to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling share-
holder."' ° Based on this interpretation, the Court concluded that, if
95. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066-67.
96. Id. The Court stated: "[a]lthough § 10 does not define what a prospectus is, it
does instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a
consistent meaning throughout." Id. See supra note 42 for excerpted text of § 10.
To support its conclusion that the term "prospectus" has the same meaning throughout
the 1933 Act, the Court examined the structure of the 1933 Act. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at
1067. In doing so, the Court considered other sections of the Act. Id. For instance, § 4
of the 1933 Act provides an exemption for transactions by "any person other than an
issuer, underwriter or dealer" and those "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering" from the registration requirements of § 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) and (2)
(1994). Section 5 prohibits the sale of unregistered securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994);
see infra note 98. Section 10 sets forth information required in prospectuses. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j (1994). Next, the Court declared that "[s]ection 11 provides for liability on
account of false registration statements; § 12(2) for liability based on misstatement in
prospectuses." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067 (citations omitted). The Court reasoned
that liability under § 12(2) could not therefore attach unless the seller was required to
distribute the prospectus. id.
97. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. The court noted that § 10 did not require that the
Agreement contain information that would have been contained in a registration
statement. Id.
98. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994)). Sections 5 and 6 of the Act require the
filing of a registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission in certain
circumstances. 15 U.S.C. 99 77e, 77f (1994). Section 2(8) defines a registration
statement as "the statement provided for in section 6, and includes any amendment
thereto and any report, document, or memorandum filed as part of such statement or
incorporated therein by reference." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(8) (1994). Section 7 sets forth the
information required in a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
99. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. See SOLOMON & PALMITER, supra note 4. See also
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e, and 77b(I 1) (1994) (requiring registration of public offerings by
an issuer or controlling shareholder).
100. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. This conclusion provided the foundation for the
Court's later analysis of the scope of "prospectus" under § 12(2). See infra notes 101-05
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the contract was not a prospectus under section 10, it could not be one
under section 12(2) either. 01
The Court then turned to section 12(2).'02 The Court focused on a
portion of section 12(2) that exempts from coverage any prospectuses
for the sale of government-issued securities.1 3 The Court reasoned
that if Congress had intended to create liability in section 12(2) for any
misrepresentations made in any written communication, then Congress
would not have provided an exemption for government-issued
securities.' The Court concluded that any existing conflicting inter-
pretation of "prospectus" disappears if the term is limited to only those
documents which an issuer uses to offer a security to the public.1
0 5
After reaching this conclusion, the Court briefly examined the
original purposes of the 1933 Act.'O° Congress primarily intended to
create federal duties or requirements, including registration and dis-
closure obligations, for public offerings.'0 7 The Court determined that
the provisions of the 1933 Act provided remedies only for violations
of these requirements, 8 rather than creating broad additional liabilities
and accompanying text.
101. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067.
102. Id. The Court stated: "[olur interpretation [of the scope of § 12(2)] is further
confirmed by a reexamination of § 12 itself. The section contains an important guide to
the correct resolution of the case." Id. For an analysis of the Court's reasoning here, see
infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
103. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a(2) (1994) (exempting from
§ 12(2) government issued securities).
104. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. See infra part IV.A for a discussion of the
Court's emphasis on "any written communication" in this part of its analysis. The
Court questioned: "[wihy would Congress grant immunity to a private seller from
liability in a rescission suit for no reason other than that the seller's misstatements
happen to relate to securities issued by a governmental entity?" Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at
1068.
105. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. The Court further reasoned that "[t]he exemption
for government-issued securities makes perfect sense on that view, for it then becomes a
precise and appropriate means of giving immunity to governmental authorities." Id.
106. Id. For'a discussion of the legislative history and purposes of the 1933 Act, see
supra part II.
107. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. In examining the federal duties imposed by the
Act, the Court looked to the purposes of the 1933 Act, namely registration of securities
and disclosure requirements for public offerings, as interpreted in prior cases. Id. The
Court relied on United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 752 (1975); and SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 n.5 (1953),
each of which noted the 1933 Act as affecting public or initial offerings of securities.
108. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. Specifically, the Court maintained: "[iut is more
reasonable to interpret the liability provisions of the 1933 Act as designed for the
primary purpose of providing remedies for violations of the obligations it had created."
Id.
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independent of those requirements.109 In maintaining this position, the
Court used its interpretation of the term "prospectus" to connect
section 12(2) to the duties created in the 1933 Act. "o
In so doing, the Gustafson Court explicitly rejected the Buyers'
argument that "a written offer is a prospectus under § 12.""' The
Court noted that under the Buyers' argument, the term "prospectus"
would encompass a "broader set of communications in section 12 than
in section 10. '' 112 The Court expressed its disagreement with the con-
clusion that Congress would define the term "prospectus" differently
in section 10 and section 12 of the 1933 Act.113
The Court next examined section 2(10), which provides the defi-
nition of "prospectus." ' 14 The Buyers argued that, based on the word
"communication" contained in section 2(10), "any written commu-
nication that offers a security for sale is a 'prospectus' ." The Court,
however, dismissed this argument as flawed."6
109. Id. The Court recognized that liability under § 12(2) could only attach for
wrongdoing in violation of the expressed purposes of the Act. Id. See supra notes 94-
101 and accompanying text. Thus, effectively, the Court limited the scope of § 12(2) to
those acts which affected registration of a security and/or the public disclosure of
information about the offering.
1 10. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
The Court never fully explained the link created between § 12(2) liability and the
obligations of registration and disclosure, other than to state, as an introduction to this
analysis, that liability under § 12(2) "cannot attach unless there is an obligation to
distribute the prospectus in the first place (or unless there is an exemption)." Gustafson,
115 S. Ct. at 1067. The Court, however, supported this conclusion by illustrating the
links of §§ 11 and 12(2) with obligations imposed by the 1933 Act. Id. The Court
noted that § I I afforded a "remedy for untrue statements in registration statements" and
that § 12(1) provided a "remedy for sales in violation of § 5, which prohibits the sale of
unregistered securities." Id. at 1068.
111. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. The Court also noted that this position was
embraced by both dissents. Id. For a discussion of the Pacific Dunlop court's reasoning,
see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
112. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068.
113. Id. at 1069. The Court reasoned that:
Had Congress meant the term 'prospectus' in § 12(2) to have a different
meaning than the same term in § 10, that is when one would have expected
Congress to have been explicit. Congressional silence cuts against, not in
favor of, Alloyd's argument. The burden should be on the proponents of the
view that the term 'prospectus' means one thing in § 12 and another in § 10 to
adduce strong textual support for that conclusion. And Alloyd adduces none.
Id. See infra part M.A for an analysis of this conclusion.
114. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069. See supra text accompanying note 9 (discussing
excerpts of § 2(10)). The Court noted that Alloyd relied heavily on this section to argue
that any offer to sell a security by means of a written communication was the equivalent
of a prospectus. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
115. Id.
116. Id. This flaw emanated from the Buyers' dependence on the word
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Instead, relying on rules of statutory interpretation, the Court
reasoned that "the definitional part of the statute must be read in its
entirety, a reading which yields the interpretation that the term prospec-
tus refers to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities."" 7
Using that definition, the Court found that the Buyers' argument was
defeated by two rules of statutory construction. Under the first rule,
any interpretation which would render some words redundant should
be avoided." 8 The Court addressed this rule by noting that, if the
word "communication" as used in section 2(10) encompassed every
written communication, this construction would render "notice,
circular, advertisement, [and] letter" redundant because each of those
terms can also be forms of written communication. " 9
The Gustafson Court resolved this constructional problem by apply-
ing a second rule of statutory construction, the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis,120 which requires that no single word in a list of words be
given such a broad meaning that would be inconsistent with its accom-
panying words.' 2' In so doing, the Court offered a "better" interpre-
tation of section 2(10); a communication can be a prospectus under
section 2(10) if it is "of wide dissemination" and is a "public commu-
nication."'' 22 The Court noted that the numerous terms used in section
"communication" in § 2(10) for its argument that "prospectus" should be broadly
interpreted. Id. The Court stated:
[t]o be sure, § 2(10) defines a prospectus as, inter alia, a "communication,
written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms
the sale of any security." The word "communication," however, on which
Alloyd's entire argument rests, is but one word in a list, a word Alloyd reads
altogether out of context.
Id. (citation omitted).
117. Id. The Court labeled this definition, incorporating a public sale requirement
into the meaning of "prospectus," as controlling the interpretation of § 2(10). Id.
118. Id. at 1068-70. See supra note 116.
119. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
120. Id. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for an explanation of this
doctrine.
121. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S.
303, 307 (1961)). This doctrine loosely means: "It is known from its associates."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has relied on this
doctrine in other instances. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36
(1990) (analyzing "reporting and recordkeeping requirements"); Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (interpreting the phrase "any note" in the 1934
Securities Act); Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (interpreting the
term "manipulative"). Specifically, in Reves, the Supreme Court held that "any note"
could not hold its literal meaning, but rather, needed to be interpreted in light of
Congress' intent in enacting the federal securities acts. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
122. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070. The Court also relied on the accepted and
understood definition of "prospectus" at the time the 1933 Act was drafted and enacted.
Id. Specifically, the Court relied on the 1910 Black's Law Dictionary, which defined
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2(10) prevent a seller of stock from using a term other than
"prospectus" in order to avoid liability, but concluded that "the term
'written communication' must be read in context to refer to writings
that, from a functional standpoint, are similar to the terms 'notice, cir-
cular, [and] advertisement'.'23 The Court thus labeled "prospectus"
as a term of art which, in order to fall within the purview of section
12(2), must be a communication to the public.'24
The Court found further support for its holding by making an
analogy to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,' 25 and to the Court's inter-
pretation of that section in United States v. Naftalin.126 The Court
relied on its earlier decision in Naftalin, where it held that section 17(a)
"was intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in the offer or sale of
securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution, or in the
prospectus as a "'document published by a company . . . or by persons acting as its
agents or assignees, setting forth the nature and objects of an issue of shares . . . and
inviting the public to subscribe to the issue."' Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
959 (2d ed. 1910)).
123. Gustafson. 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
124. Id. The court in Ballay also found "prospectus" to be a term of art. Ballay v.
Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79
(1991).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994). Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
126. 441 U.S. 768 (1979). In Naftalin, the Court held that § 17(a)(l) prohibits fraud
against brokers as well as investors. Id. at 776. The Naftalin Court found support for its
conclusion in the legislative history of the 1933 Act and its demonstrated breadth. Id. at
774-76. According to this legislative history:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business
... . The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of
unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to
place adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest
enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his ability
to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry and
development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to
aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
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course of ordinary market trading."'' 27 The Court reasoned that section
17(a) could be broadly applied, rather than limited only to public offer-
ings, because section 17(a) did not contain the limiting words "by
means of prospectus or oral communication."'' 2 8 Furthermore, the
expansive reading of section 17(a) by the Naftalin Court was
supported by clear legislative history. 29  The Court contrasted this
provision with section 12(2), which does contain limiting language,
and which does not possess legislative history supporting a broader
reading of its language to include anything other than public
offerings. 
30
Considering these arguments, the Gustafson Court concluded that
the term "prospectus" in section 12(2) does not apply to a private
agreement for the sale of securities, and that the plaintiffs therefore
could not seek to rescind the Agreement under section 12(2).'", Based
upon its holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's
opinion, remanding the case for further proceedings. 32
127. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070 (quoting Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778).
128. Id. at 1071. The Court found the lack of the word "prospectus" in § 17 to be
important, allowing the Court to distinguish its previous holding in Naftalin. Id. The
Court stated: "Ulust as the absence of limiting language [referring to the term
'prospectus'] in § 17(a) resulted in broad coverage, the presence of limiting language in
§ 12(2) requires a narrow construction." Id.
129. Id. The legislative history for § 17 provides, in part, that "fraud or deception in
the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether or not it is of the class of
securities exempted under sections 11 or 12." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1933). However, the legislative history for § 12(2) makes no such clear statement, nor
does the legislative history "hint" at such an intent. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071.
130. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071. See supra note 126. For a further discussion of
the legislative history of § 12(2), see supra note 29 and accompanying text, and see
infra note 178 and accompanying text.
13 1. The Court stated:
In sum, the word "prospectus" is a term of art referring to a document that
describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling
shareholder. The contract of sale, and its recitations, were not held out to the
public and were not a prospectus as the term is used in the 1933 Act.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
132. Id. at 1074. On remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Alloyd Co. v. Gustafson,
No. 92-2514, 1995 WL 258083, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 28, 1995). In this unpublished
opinion, the Seventh Circuit noted that, based on the Supreme Court's holding, no
federal issue remained in the case. Id. Although plaintiffs requested the Seventh Circuit
to remand their state claims, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's 1992 order
was correct. Id. That order dismissed the federal claims with prejudice but allowed the
plaintiffs to pursue their state claims. Id.
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D. The Dissents
1. Justice Thomas's Dissent
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg and Breyer, found fault with the Court's holding due in part
to the analysis used by the majority.133 First, Justice Thomas noted
that the Court should have started its analysis with the language of the
statute itself, as the Court had done previously. 134 Justice Thomas
reproached the majority for unnecessarily "turning to sources outside
the four comers of the statute [in order to interpret the word 'prospec-
tus'] rather than adopting the definition provided by Congress.' 35
Therefore, he argued, because Congress included a broad definition
within the Act, there was no need for the majority to search for the
meaning of "prospectus" outside of the statute. 36
Justice Thomas asserted that the majority improperly analyzed the
issue. First, the majority considered the definitional section of the
statute only after it reviewed the other provisions of the statute.137
Additionally, Justice Thomas suggested that the majority evaluated the
section 2(10) definition of "prospectus" by reading in ambiguities that
were not present in the language. 3 He noted the majority's use of the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis to determine that the list of words
contained in section 2(10) was limited by the use of the word "pro-
spectus," which was first in the list. 139 Justice Thomas, however,
disagreed with the majority's proposition that all the words contained
in section 2(10), such as circulars, advertisements, letters, or other
communications, must be "prospectus-like," in that they must relate to
133. Id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion supporting Justice Thomas's dissent. Id. at 1079 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting). See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
134. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1446 (1994); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). In Landreth, the Court stated that "'[tihe starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."' Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685
(citation omitted). See infra notes 137 and 174 and accompanying text.
135. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. The majority began its analysis with § 10. See supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text. Justice Thomas explained that a better approach would have been to begin with
§ 12(2) itself, and the definitional section, before consulting the structure of the Act.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra notes 117-24 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the majority's reliance on, and application of, this
maxim.
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an initial public offering.'4° Justice Thomas argued that the majority's
reliance on this doctrine, ostensibly in an effort to clarify the language,
only served to create doubt, because there was no ambiguity in section
2(10).14' He stated that "noscitur a sociis, however, does not require
us to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning
given to just one of them."'' 42
Justice Thomas instead believed that the expansive language of
section 2(10) required a broad interpretation of "prospectus."'' 43
Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that "[s]ection 2(10)'s very exhaus-
tiveness suggests that 'prospectus' is merely the first item in a long list
of covered documents, rather than a brooding omnipresence whose
meaning cabins that of all the following words.",144 He rejected the
majority's argument that such a reading created redundancy. 45 In
support of his position, Justice Thomas relied on the "catch-all" nature
of the term "communication" as used in section 2(10), noting that
Congress has employed such catch-all techniques in other provisions
of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 46
140. Id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra note 190 and accompanying text
for an example of the potential impact of this reasoning.
141. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas went on to quote from Russell
Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 520 (1923): "[n]oscitur a sociis is a
well-established and useful rule of construction, where words are of obscure or doubtful
meaning, and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove the obscurity or
doubt by reference to the associated words." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Justice
Thomas's opinion, the majority had no reason to rely on noscitur a sociis, since § 2(10)
contains no ambiguity. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas criticized the majority for using a
constructional canon where it was unnecessary, noting that the Court should construe a
statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). That canon, he stated, should be applied only "[i]n the absence of [a
statutory] definition." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct.
996, 1001 (1994)).
143. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited Congress's use of
catch-all terms in the following provisions: 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) ("term 'security' means
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, . . . or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security"'); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(9) ("term 'write' or
'written' shall include printed, lithographed, or any means of graphic communication");
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) ("term 'bank' means (A) a banking institution organized under the
laws of the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any
other banking institution"). Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas criticized the
majority for its failure to "account for Congress' decision to begin its definition of the
term 'prospectus' with the term prospectus," which inherently suggests a "partial
circularity" that the majority sought desperately to avoid. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Having dismissed the majority's argument regarding ambiguity,
Justice Thomas then rejected the majority's view that "prospectus"
must carry the same meaning in section 12 as in section 10.17 He
acknowledged the majority's position that certain other sections of the
1933 Act use the term "prospectus" to indicate only those documents
relating to an initial public offering. 4 ' Justice Thomas, however,
disagreed with the majority's use of that argument as support for the
belief that "prospectus" must be given the same meaning in sections 10
and 12 of the 1933 Act. 149 He noted that this position would unneces-
sarily require the narrow use of "prospectus" in section 10, detailing
the information necessary in a prospectus, to control the scope of
"prospectus" as used in section 12.150
Justice Thomas examined three provisions in the 1933 Act that
demonstrate the different meanings of "prospectus" in sections 10 and
12.' First, he looked to the general definition of "prospectus" as
supplied in the definitional section, section 2(10). 152 Justice Thomas
found that while the majority correctly noted the "offer a security for
sale" portion of the definition, it failed to consider the "confirms the
sale of any security" portion, which is a part of the definition of
"prospectus" in section 2(10), but not in section 10.153 He concluded
that the different definitions of "prospectus" in the two provisions of
the 1933 Act supported the conclusion that Congress did not intend
that the term have the same meaning throughout the Act.
54
147. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
Justice Thomas recognized the general presumption that the same meaning attaches to a
term throughout a statute. Gustafson, at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted,
however, that "this presumption is overcome when Congress indicates otherwise." Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
148. Gustafson, at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra note 96. The sections
that Justice Thomas and the majority refer to are § 10 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77j(a)(3) (1994) (setting forth the information required in a prospectus), § 5 of the 1933
Act, and 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994) (mandating that a prospectus be sent to buyers of
securities).
149. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained: "[s]ince § 10
assumes a narrower definition of prospectus, the majority believes that its definition
must control that of § 12." Id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority obtained
this result by considering § 10 before the language of § 12. Id. at 1066. See supra notes
94-101 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying note 9 for the language of § 2(10).
153. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that:
[i]t would be radical to say that every confirmation slip must contain all the
information that § 10 requires; only the documents accompanying an initial
public offering must contain that information. Despite the majority's
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Justice Thomas found further support for his view that "prospectus"
has different meanings in the definitional section itself. He noted the
preface to section 2, which states that the following definitions are to
apply "unless the context otherwise requires."' 5  Justice Thomas
argued that since there is a complete absence of a context requiring
otherwise in section 12(2), the default definition should be applied.'56
Furthermore, he noted that "[i]f anything, it is § 10's 'context' that
seems to require the use of a definition which is different from that of
§ 2(1O).' 57
Additionally, Justice Thomas argued that the "dual use" of the term
"prospectus" in section 2(10) clearly indicates that "prospectus" is
used in at least two different ways. 58 He disagreed with the major-
ity's interpretation of "prospectus" in section 2(10) because it essen-
tially returns to a narrow common law interpretation of "prospec-
tus.'
59
Justice Thomas then noted that section 12(2) contains none of the
limitations to initial public offerings, as suggested by the majority.'"'
protestations, it is absolutely clear that the 1933 Act uses "prospectus" in two
different ways. As a result, any justification for the majority's twisted reading
of § 2(10) disappears.
Id. (Thomas J., dissenting).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994). By starting the definitions with this preface,
Congress indicated that the section of definitions provided "default" definitions.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, "the dual use of 'prospectus' in §
2(10), which both defines 'prospectus' broadly and uses it as a term of art, makes clear
that the statute is using the word in at least two different senses." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Thus, Justice Thomas agrees with the majority that "prospectus" can be a
term of art. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He parts with the majority, however, noting
here that "prospectus," with its provided definition, need not always be interpreted as a
term of art. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, "[oin its face, § 12(2) makes none of
the usual distinctions between initial public offerings and aftermarket trading, or be-
tween public trading and privately negotiated sales." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Moreover, while other provisions of the Act expressly mention initial public offerings,
§ 12(2) does not. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas pointed to § 4 of the
1933 Act, which expressly creates an exemption for "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). Also, § 12(2) does not limit
its scope only to issuers, as does § 11 of the 1933 Act. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Section 11 provides civil liability for misrepresentations in
registration statements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). This liability is directed toward
"every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner
in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement ...... 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2) (1994).
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Rather than imposing limitations in section 12(2), Congress left the
language of section 12(2) broad.' 6' Justice Thomas stated that had
Congress intended section 12(2) to be limited to public offerings,
Congress would have employed words like "'issuer,' 'public offer-
ing,' or 'private,' or 'resale,' or at least discussed trading on the ex-
changes or the liability of dealers, underwriters, and issuers."' 62 The
silence of section 12(2) with respect to these issues, he maintained, is
noteworthy. 1 63
Justice Thomas next suggested that the majority misread Naftalin by
limiting that holding to its facts instead of applying it to the present
case. 164  He added that two of the arguments the Court rejected in
Naftalin were relevant to Gustafson. First, in Naftalin, the Court
rejected the argument that the sheer structure of the 1933 Act required
limiting the scope of section 17 to initial public offerings. 65 Second,
Justice Thomas recalled that the Court in Naftalin declined to accept the
161. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1076-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting). None of these words, which would
signal a limitation of § 12(2), appear in the provision.
163. Id. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas supported his dissent in
Gustafson by reference to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Central Bank of
Denver, the Court held that § 10(b) of the 1934 Act did not impose liability on aiders
and abettors. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1455. In reaching this holding, the
Court found that "[i]f. . . Congress had intended to impose aiding and abetting liability,
we presume it would have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text. But it did
not." Id. at 1448.
Relying on this rule of construction, Justice Thomas similarly reasoned that the lack
of terms relating to public offerings or issuers in § 12(2) necessarily supports the
application of liability to private and secondary market transactions. Gustafson, 115 S.
Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also found persuasive support for
his position by comparing § 12(2) to § 4 of the 1933 Act. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See supra note 96 for an explanation of § 4. Justice Thomas explained that had
Congress intended to further limit § 12(2) to only initial public offerings, as the
majority posited, Congress could have clearly provided for this by a reference to the § 4
exemptions. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Additionally,
Justice Thomas noted that § 12(2) explicitly exempted government securities from the
antifraud remedies, illustrating that "Congress knew how to exempt certain securities
and transactions when it wanted to." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Naftalin, the Court
held that § 17 of the 1933 Act extended beyond the initial distributions to secondary
market transactions. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979). For a
discussion of the majority's reliance on Naftalin, see supra notes 126-30 and
accompanying text.
165. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778. Justice Thomas explained that in analyzing the
statutory structure in Naftalin, the Court stressed that the language of § 17 "makes no
distinctions between the two kinds of transactions [initial distributions and ordinary
market trading]." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778).
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argument that merely because the 1934 Act applies specifically to fraud
in secondary market transactions, the 1933 Act could only apply to
new offerings. 66 Therefore, Justice Thomas argued, had "the ma-
jority wished to remain faithful to Naftalin," it would have applied a
similar analysis in Gustafson, and would have found that section 12(2)
applies to both secondary and private transactions.'67
Lastly, Justice Thomas examined the public policy motives behind
the majority decision, stating that "[tihe majority's analysis of § 12(2)
[was] motivated by its policy preferences."' 6 He added that the ma-
jority acted upon an assumption "that Congress could never have
intended to impose liability on sellers engaged in secondary trans-
actions."' 169 Justice Thomas argued that the Court should have applied
the policies articulated by Congress rather than question Congress'
intent. 70 He concluded that the majority's pervasive reliance on public
policy overshadowed and disrupted the norms of statutory inter-
166. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In fact, in Naftalin, the
Court stated "[tihe fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor
unfortunate." Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 468 (1969)). See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
overlap between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
167. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In reaching this
assumption, Justice Thomas pointed out that nowhere else in the Securities Acts does a
cause of action for private or secondary sales of securities exist: "[oinly § 12(2)
explicitly provided a broad remedy for private or aftermarket sales." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded that "[i]f anything, Naftalin implements the
opposite rule [of the majority reading]: that a provision of the 1933 Act extends to both
initial public offerings and secondary trading unless the text makes a 'distinctio[n]
between the two kinds of transactions."' Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Naftalin,
441 U.S. at 778).
168. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that "[u]nfortunately, the
majority's decision to pursue its policy preferences comes at the price of disrupting the
process of statutory interpretation." Id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra part
IV.A.
169. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted
that while the majority was "reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional
liabilities that are entirely independent of the new substantive obligations that the Act
enumerates," Congress did just that in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, as well as in § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas suggested that:
[t]he majority is concerned that a contrary reading would have a drastic impact
on the thousands of private and secondary transactions by imposing new
liabilities and new transaction costs. But the majority forgets that we are only
enforcing Congress' decision to impose such standards of conduct and
remedies upon sellers. If the majority believes that § 12(2)'s requirements are
too burdensome for the securities markets, it must rely upon other branches of
government to limit the 1933 Act.
Id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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pretation, 17' arguing that "[t]he majority does not permit Congress to
implement its intent unless it does so exactly as the Court wants it
to.', 172  In further analyzing the underlying public policy concerns,
Justice Thomas accepted and shared the majority's concern that an
application of section 12(2) to private and secondary market trans-
actions might potentially increase the amount of litigation. 173 He
maintained, however, that such a concern was clearly the province of
Congress, not the Court.
174
2. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
In Justice Ginsburg's separate dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, she
strongly supported Justice Thomas's analysis. Justice Ginsburg fo-
cused on the language of section 2(10), finding that the definition
provided did not "confine the § 12(2) term 'prospectus' to public
offerings.' 7 5 She described the majority decision as a "backward
reading," with the analysis beginning in the wrong place. 76  Further-
171. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas summarized the flaws
in the majority opinion:
The majority's method turns on its head the common-sense approach to
interpreting legal documents. The majority begins by importing a definition
of "prospectus" from beyond the four comers of the 1933 Act that fits the
precise use of the term in § 10. Initially ignoring the definition of
"prospectus" provided at the beginning of the statute by Congress, the
majority finally discusses § 2(10) to show that it does not utterly preclude its
preferred meaning. Only then does the majority decide to parse the language
of the provision at issue.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In this statement, Justice Thomas seems to be
suggesting that any changes in the meaning of "prospectus" under § 12(2) should be left
to Congress, rather than being imposed by judicial fiat. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added specifically that "it is for
Congress, and not for this Court, to determine the desired level of securities liability."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He relied on the 1994 decision of the Court in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1442
(1994). Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In that case, the Court weighed public policy
considerations and stated that those considerations "cannot override our interpretation
of the text and structure because such arguments do not show that adherence to the text
and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it."
Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1442 (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S.
184, 191 (1991)). See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
noted that "[t]he items listed in the defining provision [§ 2(10)], notably 'letters' and
'communications,' are common in private and secondary sales, as well as in public
offerings." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also criticized the majority for
bypassing § 2(10). Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg explains: "[t]o justify its back-
ward reading-proceeding from § 10 to § 2(10) and not the other way round--the Court
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more, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority's reasoning, which
enabled it to find consistency in the different definitions of "prospec-
tus" in section 10 and section 12(2)."'
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg examined the legislative history of
the 1933 Act 178 and other scholarly works, 7 9 finding support for a
broad reading of "prospectus," without limitation. Based upon those
findings, Justice Ginsburg, like Justice Thomas, suggested that this
issue would best be resolved through Congressional action."
IV. ANALYSIS
The Gustafson Court found that the term prospectus in section 12(2)
states that it 'cannot accept the conclusion that [the operative word prospectus] means
one thing in one section of the Act and something quite different in another'." Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court's past decisions
"constantly recognize[d] that 'a characterization fitting in certain contexts may be
unsuitable in others'." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Nations Bank of N.C.,
N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 816 (1995)). Therefore, any
presumption that the same word used throughout a statute has the same meaning need not
be rigid and unyielding, especially where common sense warrants a different conclusion.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg noted that "[i]t is not
unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is
no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the
meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance." Id. (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
433 (1932)).
177. Much of Justice Ginsburg's criticism stems from the order in which the majority
considered the various statutory provisions. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra
note 171. Justice Ginsburg also attacks the majority on its consistent meaning analy-
sis: "[a]ccording 'prospectus' discrete meanings in § 10 and § 12(2) is consistent with
Congress' specific instruction in § 2 that definitions apply 'unless the context other-
wise requires'." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 77b (1994)). See supra text accompanying note 9 for the relevant text of §
2(10).
178. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1081-1083. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
examining the legislative history, Justice Ginsburg found support for her argument from
the British Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (1929). The drafters of the 1933 Act
used this British Act as a base for the 1933 Act's structure and scope. See SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953); James M. Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1933).
179. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that scholars and commentators discussing the
Act's passage understood the Act to encompass secondary market transactions and
private transactions, as well as public offerings. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1082
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying on Frankfurter, supra note I, at 108; and William 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 183
(1933)).
180. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1083 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice
Ginsburg stated that "[i]f adjustment [to the scope of § 12(2)] is in order, as the Court's
opinion powerfully suggests it is, Congress is equipped to undertake the alteration." Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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of the 1933 Act does not apply to a privately negotiated agreement for
the sale of securities.'81 Therefore, the plaintiffs could not seek
rescission of the agreement under section 12(2).82 In so holding, the
Supreme Court continued its trend of shrinking the remedies available
to private plaintiffs under the 1933 Act. 8 3 Although the majority
determined that the private plaintiff remedy of rescission under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act should be limited, such a restriction of the
statutory rights does not appear to be fully supported by the Court's
analysis. Thus, Gustafson manifests a further willingness of the
Court to depart from a broad, expansive interpretation of the federal
securities laws.
This Part reviews the majority's departure from traditional methods
of statutory analysis. 8 4 This Part also analyzes the problems in the
majority's decision, focusing on underlying public policy concerns
and the majority's goal-oriented approach to Gustafson.8 5 Finally,
this Part notes that the underlying facts of Gustafson may have influ-
enced the Court's final decision, evidencing a holding that may be
limited to its facts in the future.8 6
A. The Use of Canons of Statutory Interpretation to Depart from a
Broad, Expansive View of the 1933 Securities Act
Established law provides that the beginning point for any analysis
regarding the interpretation of a statute must be the language of the
statutory provision itself.8 7 Additionally, courts may not look past the
language of the statute for interpretative guidance unless, first, the
181. Id. at 1073-74.
182. Id.
1 83. The trend of shrinking private plaintiff remedies under the federal securities acts
is notable in Supreme Court cases such as Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (eliminating the right of
private plaintiffs to bring suit against attorneys, accountants, and others who indirectly
assisted a securities fraud); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350 (1991) (shortening the time in which private plaintiffs can file suit); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Commentators have noted that these types of
decisions represent a departure from the broad and expansive view of the securities laws
envisioned in 1933. See, e.g., Rob Wells, Supreme Court Decisions Make Major Strides
in Litigation Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 3, 1995, 1995 WL 6374096 (noting
that "[tihe court is almost systematically restricting private rights under the securities
laws," quoting David Mahaffey, special counsel for a Washington, D.C. law firm, and a
former Securities and Exchange Commission attorney).
184. See infra notes 187-211 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
187. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756. (1975).
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plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous, or second, an application of
the plain meaning would yield a bizarre result.188 Instead of starting
with the language of section 12(2) itself, however, the Court began
with section 10 to determine the proper scope of the term "prospec-
tus.' ' 189 Nonetheless, starting with a section other than the language of
section 12(2) allowed the majority to reach its desired result, a restric-
tion on private-plaintiff securities litigation."
Normally, when determining the proper interpretation of a specific
term in a statute, courts will first examine the definitional section of
that statute.' 9' Congress provided a series of definitions in section 2
of the 1933 Act, including the definition of "prospectus."'' 92 The ma-
jority, however, did not review the definitional section of the 1933 Act
until well into its opinion. 93  Moreover, when the Court finally
decided to discuss section 2(10), the Court relied on the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis for its interpretation of that provision, without
sufficient justification.'94 Basing many of its conclusions on this doc-
trine involving the relationship between words, the majority managed
to take a fairly straightforward provision of the 1933 Act and turn it
into a circular and, therefore meaningless, provision. Thus, the
Court's decision, for the most part, renders ineffective the explicit
definition of "prospectus" in section 2(10), which includes the
188. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S.
Ct. 1439, 1442 (1994). See supra notes 134, 163, and 174 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these rules of statutory construction.
189. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (1995). Both dissents
discuss this flaw in the majority's opinion. See supra notes 134 and 176-77 and
accompanying text.
190. However, in its haste to justify its preferred end result, the majority failed to
closely examine the impact of its analysis. Now, the Supreme Court has granted itself
and lower courts ample ammunition for the creative interpretation of other statutory
provisions certain to be reviewed in the future. This decision gives courts the leeway, in
a case of statutory interpretation, to leave the language of the statute itself for
consideration after the Court considers any other provision it chooses.
191. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should have relied on the definitional section of the 1933 Act, § 2(10), to determine the
proper scope of the term "prospectus"). See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (defining "prospectus" in § 2(10)).
193. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of this portion
of the Court's opinion.
194. Justice Thomas aptly explained the reasons why the majority improperly
employed this doctrine. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. For instance,
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis should generally be applied only where ambiguity
exists. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. Yet, the Supreme Court, like
other lower courts before, relied on this doctrine of construction to limit the scope of §
12(2). See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689-90
(1991) (discussing how the structure of the Act supports a narrow reading of §12(2)),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
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expansive term "communication." '95
The majority's statutory interpretation analysis also emphasized the
structure of the 1933 Act independently, as well as the overarching
structure of the securities laws as a whole.' This emphasis focused
on a comparison of section 12(2) to other statutory provisions. By
reasoning backward,'97 the majority crafted an explanation for why
"prospectus" could not include documents relating to private or sec-
ondary transactions.'98
Specifically, the Court relied largely on section 10 of the Act and
created a relationship between the term "prospectus" as used in section
10 and section 12(2).' 99 Logically, section 10 speaks not to the
definition or scope of a prospectus, but to the information which must
be disseminated to the public.2" Yet, the majority rejected this argu-
ment, instead finding that the use of the term "prospectus" in section
10, applying only to the information required in a prospectus, neces-
sarily controls the scope of "prospectus" as used in section 12(2).20
However, the relationship the Court created between section 10 and
section 12(2) is unwarranted.2 2
195. On this point, Justice Thomas set forth an analogy which clearly illustrates this
flaw in the majority's analysis of § 2(10):
Suppose that the Act regulates cars, and that § 2(10) of the Act defines a "car"
as any car, motorcycle, truck, or trailer. Section 10 of this hypothetical
statute then declares that a car shall have seatbelts, and § 5 states that it is
unlawful to sell cars without seatbelts. Section 12(2) of this Act then creates a
cause of action for misrepresentations that occur during the sale of a car. It is
reasonable to conclude that §§ 5 and 10 apply only to what we ordinarily refer
to as "cars," because it would be absurd to require motorcycles and trailers to
have seatbelts. But the majority's reasoning would lead to the further
conclusion that § 12(2) does not cover sales of motorcycles, when it is clear
that the Act includes such sales.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. See supra note 96.
197. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra note 176.
198. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069. See supra notes 158-63 and 175-77 for Justices
Thomas's and Ginsburg's criticisms of this analysis.
199. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
200. See supra note 117.
201. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069. See supra note 113.
202. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. The majority found further support
for its analysis from the express language of § 12(2). Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067-68.
When discussing the language of § 12(2), the Court focused almost solely on the grant
of exemption for government-issued securities in § 12(2). Id. See supra notes 102-05.
However, the Court offered oblique reasoning for the inclusion of this exemption in §
12(2). The majority found that the presence of the exemption in the § 12(2) provision
made "perfect sense." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068; see supra note 105. But does it? A
close examination of the structure of the Act, as Justice Thomas pointed out, reveals that
the placement of an exemption in § 12(2) was probably intentional, as Congress desired
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Additionally, the Court's refusal to follow the statutory reasoning of
Naftalin further suggests that the majority was deciding the case in an
outcome-oriented fashion, rather than with regard to the Court's pre-
vious interpretations of the securities acts.2 3 In fact, Justice Thomas
heavily criticized the majority for inexplicably limiting the holding of
Naftalin.2° In light of the Court's holding in Naftalin, which deliber-
ately interpreted section 17(a) of the 1933 Act broadly so as not to limit
its application solely to initial offerings, the Court should have
similarly been willing to read section 12(2) liability broadly. 205
Moreover, the overarching structure of the federal securities laws
suggests that the Court may have simplified the distinctions between
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.20 6 A review of the 1934 Act reveals that
Congress did not include a cause of action for these types of privately
negotiated contract transactions in the 1934 Act.20 7 Congress had the
chance a year later to clarify the scope of the 1933 Act on this point
and did not do so, thus suggesting that Congress saw no need because
the 1933 Act already provided a rescission remedy for privately nego-
20tiated transactions. 08 While the legislative history on this issue is
notably sparse,20 9 shortly after the Act was passed, commentators
to limit the scope of § 12(2) only with regard to governmental securities. See
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
If Congress intended such a limitation for all private or secondary transactions, it
would seem logical that such an exemption would be expressly stated in § 12(2) or in
another, more complete provision where the exemption for government securities could
have also been included in the 1933 Act. Congress, however, did not choose to so limit
§ 12(2). By limiting § 12(2) with its holding, the majority opinion significantly devi-
ates from the express language of the 1933 statute. On the face of the statute, § 12(2)
applies to any offer or sale of security, without regard to exemptions. 15 U.S.C. §
771(2) (1994).
203. The Court's refusal to extend the rationale of Naftalin to § 12(2) threatens the
notion of legal precedent. Although § 12(2) is different from § 17(a), the reasoning the
Court applied in Naftalin applies equally to the issues in Gustafson. See supra note 164
and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
205. See Hirsch, supra note 29, at 984. Concluding his article, Mr. Hirsch notes that
the "bright line distinction" often applied to distinguish the 1933 Act from the 1934
Act was undercut by the Court's decision in Naftalin that "the 1933 Act's criminal
counterpart to § 12(2) applies equally to the primary and secondary markets." Hirsch,
supra note 30, at 984. For a discussion of the Gustafson Court's application of Naftalin,
see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
206. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994).
208. See Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court at * 15, Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1994) (No. 93-404), 1994 WL 757605. See also Loss,
supra note 30, at 914 (asserting that § 12(2) should apply to ordinary trading). See also
supra note 174.
209. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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viewed the purpose of the Act as extending beyond initial distri-
butions. 2 0  The Court appears to have overlooked this fact, which
supports the position that section 12(2) liability should be read as ex-
tending beyond initial distributions. 1
B. The Role of Public Policy Underlying Gustafson: How the
Gustafson Holding Evidences Goal-oriented Decision Making
Veiled in the majority's opinion are public policy concerns focusing
on the extension of already widespread private securities litigation and
the potential impact of a plaintiff-oriented decision on the securities
industry.21 2 Similar concerns about extensive private securities liti-
gation were expressed by the Court in decisions pre-dating Gustafson,
when the Court decided other issues under the securities laws.2t3 The
Court addressed these concerns in Gustafson, where it shunned a
broad reading of "prospectus," interpreting it to apply only to the
210. Arthur Dean, writing in FORTUNE in 1933, noted that a secondary purpose of the
1933 Act "has to do with the sale of securities, old and new, subsequent to their original
issue and distribution, and with respect to these its purpose is that upon any sale thereof
they shall be honestly and completely represented." Dean, supra note 21, at 50.
211. Support for this position is drawn from the relationship of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. For example:
Congress did not repeat section 17(a) or section 12(2) in the 1934 Act for a
good reason: there was no need. Although it is convenient shorthand to say
that the 1933 Act relates to distributions and the 1934 Act to postdistribution
trading, this distinction does not accurately describe the relationship between
the two acts.
Loss, supra note 30, at 915. Furthermore, in this sense, the majority overlooked the
Court's opinion in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1960), where the
Court found that "the interdependence of the various sections of the [federal] securities
laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has
chosen .... " Congress's silence in the 1934 Act with regard to antifraud remedies for
secondary or private transactions accomplished through misstatements, speaks
volumes. SEC, 390 U.S. at 466.
212. Justice Thomas also referenced these considerations and noted that the majority
had considered the public policy ramifications of an extended scope of § 12(2).
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas
noted concerns over increased private litigation, while the parties and amici curiae
expressed concerns over increased transaction costs and increased burdens on security
issuers. Iia (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra note 173.
213. For instance, when approached with the issue of the required elements for a cause
of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Court narrowed the scope of the statute. In a
line of cases beginning with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976), the
Court imposed a scienter requirement for § 10(b) private actions. Ernst & Ernst, 425
U.S. at 199. Id. By so doing, the Court thwarted the expansive nature of § 10(b) and
narrowed the potential applications of the provision to nothing more than that provided
at common law. More recently, the Court reduced the time in which investors could file
an action for securities fraud. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991).
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"public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling share-
holder., 214 As a result, parties who purchase securities in a private,
secondary market transaction cannot seek a remedy under section
12(2) for any misrepresentations occurring in the transaction. 21
While the majority never explicitly stated in its opinion that it
considered public policy in reaching its decision, 16 other evidence
shows that the Court was attempting to address public policy con-
cerns. During oral argument, for instance, the Court repeatedly ques-
tioned attorneys on how an encompassing definition of "prospectus"
would affect certain written documents produced by the securities
industry.1 7 These questions appeared to be in response to public
policy concerns that the parties expressed in briefs submitted to the
Court.21 8 However, while concerns about an expansive scope of
214. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
215. Id.
216. While not explicitly mentioning many of the concerns that were expressed in
oral argument, the Court did note the effects a broad reading of the scope of § 12(2) could
have on the securities industry. Id. at 1071. The Court stated that:
It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for
every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market.
It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those engaged in casual
communications not to omit some fact that would, if included, qualify the
accuracy of the statement. Under Alloyd's view any casual communication
between buyer and seller in the aftermarket could give rise to an action for
rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or reliance on the
part of the buyer.
Id. By implication, the Court here expressed its desire to restrict securities litigation.
Id.
217. The Court focused on research reports prepared by analysts, as suggested in the
SIA brief. See infra note 218. During oral argument, the Court questioned each arguing
attorney about whether these types of research reports would be included under the
various interpretations of "prospectus." Transcript of Oral Argument before the Supreme
Court at *8, *10, and *14, Gustafson (No. 93-404), 1994 WL 757605.
218. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, supra note 92, at *39. Sellers argued that a broad
construction of § 12(2) would turn state contract cases into federal cases with a heavy
burden of proof on defendants. Id. at *41. The Buyers, on the other hand, argued, among
other things, that a narrow reading of § 12(2) could not be justified merely by concerns
over increased transaction costs. Respondent's Brief, supra note 66, at *41 -*42.
The SIA argued that a broad interpretation of "prospectus" could have made many of
those involved in the investment industry vulnerable to heightened risks of liability.
See SIA's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 84. The SIA argued that any application of §
12(2) to secondary market transactions would discourage the communication of market
research to the investing public. Id. The SIA explained that research and due diligence
performed by stock issuers would be subject to liability under § 12(2). Id. The SIA noted
that:
If the term "prospectus" in Section 12(2) is construed to include virtually all
written communications, including research reports, securities firms will be
extremely circumspect in issuing such reports in the future given their po-
tential liability under Section 12(2) and the burden of defending such claims.
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section 12(2) are perhaps justified,219 the issues addressed at oral argu-
ment were not specifically before the Court.2
Undoubtedly, these considerations at least partially influenced the
decision of the Court. The Court chose to rely on public policy con-
siderations, even if they did not explicitly adopt them, that supported a
restriction of the federal securities laws and restrictions on the rights of
private plaintiffs. However, while public policy considerations are
often reviewed in support of court decisions, review of those policy
considerations is not warranted absent ambiguity in legislative
intent.22  As the definition of prospectus in the 1933 Act did not
evidence any ambiguity, the majority improperly considered public
policy to support its holding, even if that reliance never explicitly ap-
peared in the opinion.2  The majority gave unnecessary deference to
public policy concerns because no bizarre outcome would result from
adhering to the language of the statute."
Id. While this may be a compelling argument, Congress could easily amend § 12(2) to
prevent such a result. See also Supreme Court-Securities Law Narrowed, 55 FACTS ON
FILE, No. 2832, at 167, 1995 WL 7732055 (stating the SIA's position that a broad
interpretation of § 12(2) would have rendered all money managers, brokers, and
investors vulnerable to unreasonable risk liability).
219. Scholars are currently debating, however, whether the assumption that private
securities litigation is too excessive is actually evidenced by lawsuit data. See
generally, Douglas C. Buffone, Predatory Attorneys and Professional Plaintiffs:
Reforms Are Needed to Limit Vexatious Securities Litigation, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655,
658-59 (1995) (noting the existence of debate regarding the extent of securities
litigation); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's
"Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority", 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (discussing proposed
restrictions to the securities laws in the context of class action lawsuits).
220. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 66, at *11. Alloyd noted that the research
reports of securities firms that are often given to customers were not at issue in the case
and that the Court had no need to resolve that issue in deciding the case. Id.
The Court did not specifically rely on how a broad reading of "prospectus" might
adversely impact the preparation and dissemination of research reports by the securities
industry in reaching its holding. However, such an issue surely played a determinative
role in the outcome of the case, offering the Court an example of a profound effect of
interpreting "prospectus" to include "any written communication." See Transcript of
Oral Argument, at *9-*10, *12, *17, Gustafson (No. 93-404), 1994 WL 757605
(questioning how a broad interpretation of "prospectus" would impact research reports).
Such a focus, however, seems to overlook the fact that research reports would not
universally fall under the rubric of "prospectus" if the report did not offer for sale or
confirm a sale of a security. See Transcript of Oral Argument at * 12, Gustafson (No. 93-
404), 1994 WL 757605 (where counsel for the Buyers argued that brokerage research
reports would not necessarily create any § 12(2) liability).
221. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1442 (1994). For this rule of law, see supra note 134 and 174.
222. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
223. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1075 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
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With this in mind, the result of Gustafson can perhaps be viewed as
an approach taken by the majority in an effort to stem the tide of secu-
rities litigation.224 Notwithstanding the Court's goal-oriented reason-
ing, this issue before the Court, the scope of "prospectus" under sec-
tion 12(2), could have been resolved in a much more straightforward
fashion, as indicated in the dissenting opinions.2
C. The Peculiar Facts of Gustafson
The facts of this case reveal that the Buyers were compensated for
the inadequate estimates contained in the Agreement. 6 In fact, the
Buyers received full compensation long before the case reached the
Supreme Court.227 Yet, still unsatisfied, the Buyers turned to the
federal securities laws for further relief, despite the existence of a
viable state law contract action 8 This particular fact is of extreme
importance. Underlying the Supreme Court's decision seems to be
some element of frustration with the case, in that the parties continued
with litigation despite the availability of a contractual remedy and actual
restitution. 29 Perhaps, had a case with a different set of facts been
presented to resolve the crucial question regarding the scope of section
12(2) liability, the result would have been vastly different. 230
dissenting).
224. See generally Wells, supra note 183 (commenting that Gustafson "effectively
narrows the legal options [available] to investors who claim they've been defrauded
when purchasing stocks"); Richard Carelli, High Court Limits Legal Rights 1933 Law
Gives to Stock Buyers, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 1, 1995, at 12 (discussing the limit-
ing effect of Gustafson); Joan Biskupic, Court Limits Stock Fraud Law; Ruling
Eliminates a Recourse for Private Buyers, WASH. POST, Mar. I, 1995, at C2 (reporting
that private buyers no longer have any recourse under § 12(2) in light of Gustafson); see
FACTS ON FILE, supra note 218 (noting that "a key protection offered to investors under.
. . [the 1933 Act] extended only to those who purchased stock in an initial public
offering.").
225. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1074, 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Seemingly, with this decision, the Court may have encroached upon
Congress's powers to legislate in anticipation of future dilemmas. See supra note I and
accompanying text (discussing the dangers of using legislation as anticipation). It is
not the province of the Courts to legislate and, notably, "[i]t is not for the judiciary to
eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it .... " Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-50 (1985).
226. See supra text accompanying note 74.
227. See supra text accompanying note 74.
228. See, e.g., Supreme Court's Definition of "Prospectus" Favors Rule 144A
Market, FIN. REG. REP., Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FRR file
(addressing the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's decision in
Gustafson to resort to federal law.).
229. Id. (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court majority was clearly put off by the
plaintiffs resort to federal law.").
230 However, it appears that the Supreme Court saw an immediate need to resolve a
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However, the majority could not reach its resolution of the issue at
hand in a vacuum. Therefore, it is possible that the Buyers' receipt of
full payment in restitution for the wrong influenced the eventual out-
come, even if such was not the intent. If so, then perhaps Gustafson
can be limited to its facts, thereby still allowing some remedy for
future plaintiffs. 23' This fact, coupled with the Court's tendency to
restrict the securities laws, may have only added to the Court's frus-
tration with the extent of private party litigation in the securities field.
As both dissents in Gustafson stressed, however, this litigious issue
would be best left to congressional action, rather than the Court, which
judicially eliminated a remedy afforded to private plaintiffs by the 1933
Congress.232
V. IMPACT
The Gustafson decision further restricts the broad federal securities
laws, akin to the court-created restrictions in section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.233 In departing from past broad interpretations of the Securities
Acts, the Supreme Court created extra insulation for sellers of secu-
rities while at the same time eliminating a remedy afforded by Con-
gress to private plaintiffs.
This decision is certainly a boon to those working in the field of
securities. 234 Brokers, dealers and other sellers literally have one less
circuit split and therefore had every intention of deciding Gustafson despite the fact that
the Buyers had already been compensated. See Maynard, supra note 82.
231. The facts of Gustafson may easily allow for the limitation of the Court's
holding. Gustafson clearly involved a private stock purchase agreement, completed by
sophisticated buyers after the requisite due diligence. Gustafson, No. 91C889,
Memorandum Opinion and Order (N. D. Ill. May 29, 1992). See supra note 78 for the
lower court's discussion of the facts. Therefore, other cases, involving perhaps a
private transaction without the benefit of sophisticated buyers and due diligence, could
have differing results. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 170 and 180. See also Hirsch, supra note 29, at 975
(supporting congressional rather than judicial change to the scope of § 12(2)). Hirsch
argues that "while it would be inappropriate for courts to selectively apply § 12(2)'s
express statutory remedy, Congress should amend § 12(2) to apply only to those
aftermarket transactions where the market for security is not efficient." Id. (emphasis in
original).
233. Wells, supra note 183. This article notes that "[w]hile lobbyists and legislators
have little to show from their fight [to reform private securities fraud lawsuits],
substantial headway has been made by another arm of government--the Supreme Court."
Id. In fact, Gustafson, along with two other recent court decision, "effectively narrows
the legal options to investors who claim they've been defrauded when purchasing
stocks." Id.
234. See, e.g., FED. SEC. L. REP., 18, No. 1653, (March 17, 1995) (stating that the
Court's decision in Gustafson "represents a significant victory for the business and
investment community). In an interview with Donald W. Jenkins, counsel for the
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remedial provision of the 1933 Act with which to be concerned. 235
Now, not only does section 10 of the 1934 Act leave buyers with a
difficult burden to prove in order to obtain relief, section 12(2) of the
1933 Act poses substantial hurdles to defrauded buyers as well.236
Moreover, by limiting section 12(2), the majority merely duplicated the
effect of section 11 of the 1933 Act.237 Section 11 of the 1933 Act
provides for civil liability for fraud in connection with a registration
statement.238 By holding that a prospectus is not the same thing as any
written communication, the majority defined a prospectus as essen-
tially a selling document used in conjunction with a public offering.239
This definition, however, controlled by section 10, all but mimics the
requirements of a registration statement. 240  The majority opinion
effectively defines a prospectus in the terms of a registration statement.
Such a definition makes all parts of section 12 superfluous, because
section 1 1 would then be sufficient to address any issues of fraud in
connection with a prospectus, as well as with a registration state-
ment.
24
Sellers, the journal noted that "the importance of the Court's ruling flows primarily from
its prophylactic impact in barring many claims where a disappointed purchaser who
cannot show fraud under Rule lob-5 hopes to satisfy what the attorney called the 'far
more lenient showing under § 12(2)."' Id. The Court's ruling also provides more
certainty for structuring private transactions. Id. Moreover, had the Court found in
favor of expanded remedies, transaction costs for private transactions would have surely
increased. Id. See also FACTS ON FILE, supra note 218 (stating the Supreme Court's
opinion that § 12(2) was not intended for every communication in the secondary
market).
235. Supreme Court Settles Securities Law, supra note 87.
236. Buyers defrauded in their purchase of stock in the secondary market now must
prove scienter in order to recover. See Prentice, supra note 30, at 100-03.
237. Credit for this argument must go to Professor Michael J. Kaufman, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. See supra note 160 for an explanation of § Ii. For
a discussion on the overlap between § 11 and § 12(2), see Weiss, supra note 23.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
239. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1073-74 (1995).
240. Shortly after the passage of the 1933 Act, however, William O. Douglas and
George E. Bates, noted that § 12(2) could provide compensation for untrue statements or
omissions of material facts, whether or not the security was registered. William 0.
Douglas and George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 177
(1933). While this statement may not be definitive on the scope of § 12(2), clearly the
registration requirements of other sections were not prerequisites to liability under §
12(2). As such, under this reading of the statute, a private transaction could create
potential liability under § 12(2).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). Section 112 provides for civil liabilities in
connection with false registration statements. Id. By narrowing the scope of
"prospectus" as used in § 12(2), the Supreme Court seemingly attributes to a prospectus
the characteristics of a registration statement. See supra notes 237-40 and
accompanying text. Therefore, § 11 might be essentially applicable to some
prospectuses as now interpreted by the Supreme Court. See supra note 237.
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Thus, the Supreme Court's decision effectively eliminates a cause of
action where the underlying transaction is based upon a private sales
contract. Congress provided a remedy and the Court took that remedy
away. In similar cases, the only remedy now available to plaintiffs is a
fraud remedy, which requires scienter.242 This holding is bound to
have effects far beyond the courtroom. Indeed, by depriving private
plaintiffs of this remedy, incentives to purchase stock in any secondary
market transaction, or even in a privately negotiated transaction, have
also been drastically reduced. 43 The potentially powerful weapon
conferred by section 12(2) upon private plaintiffs has been greatly
diminished.
Significantly, the Court did not go as far as to say that all private
offerings were excluded from the scope of section 12(2).244 The Court
only maintained that the private contract at issue was not a prospectus
under the meaning of section 12(2).245 This specific holding may
242. See supra notes 47-50. Plaintiffs can seek relief under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
See also Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?,
63 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1995) (discussing legislative intent in connection
with § 12(2)). Mr. Thel suggested that when the Supreme Court decides the scope of §
12(2), "it should focus on the implications of § 12(2) for the private-liability regime it
has adopted under rule lob-5. The Court should give § 12(2) the scope it believes best
serves a wise coherent scheme of private liability." Id. Interestingly, the Court did no
explicit comparison between § 12(2) remedies and § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 remedies in
its opinion. Many of the lower courts considering the scope of § 12(2) analyzed these
sections contemporaneously. See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co.,
993 F.2d 578, 589 (7th Cir. 1993); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d
682, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
243. See Wells, supra note 183, at 1. Wells notes that "[s]ome securities attorneys
believe the trend is substantial enough that investors in failed savings and loans might
not be able to recoup their money through private lawsuits. Others disagree, saying the
real world effects of the court's [sic] decisions may not have a substantial effect on
investors." Wells, supra note 183, at 1.
244. In fact, much of the Court's opinion focuses on secondary market transactions
as well as private transactions. This dual approach to the issue could create confusion in
future cases. See supra note 231.
245. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069. This fact may have been important in creating a
majority in Gustafson. As one commentator notes, "there are signs in this opinion that
Kennedy and his side may have won the majority at the last minute. The language of
Kennedy's opinion . . . suggests that Kennedy originally was writing a dissent." Joan
Biskupic, Court Limits Stock Fraud Law; Ruling Eliminates a Recourse for Private
Buyers, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995, at C2.
An argument can be made for narrowing the Gustafson case to its facts, as the Court
appeared to do here. The Buyers in this case were sophisticated and had fully researched
the company before purchasing it. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064-65. They evidenced
their sophistication when they insisted on a remedial clause in the Agreement, and were
fully compensated pursuant to this clause. Id. at 1065. See supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text. Thus, there was no need to apply § 12(2) to the Agreement, because
the plaintiffs had already received full compensation. In future cases, however, with less
sophisticated buyers, there may be a need to impose § 12(2) liability when the buyers
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prove beneficial in the sense that other private offerings may be subject
to liability under section 12(2). However, at the same time, until the
Gustafson holding is limited to its facts, it is private buyers who may
bear the brunt of its impact. The ramifications of the Court's decision
are monumental. 246
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson goes beyond mere
statutory interpretation. This holding will affect all decisions of
investors on purchases that occur outside of an initial offering. The
Supreme Court should have followed its reasoning in previous cases
involving the interpretation of the federal securities act. If the Court
had interpreted section 12(2) consistent with past precedent, plaintiffs
here, and in the future, would be afforded a stronger statutory remedy
for fraud in secondary market transactions. Deviating from a broad in-
terpretation of section 12(2), the Supreme Court manifestly changed
the outlook for securities laws in an effort to curb future litigation.
However, by limiting a plaintiff's right to a remedy, the ramifications
of the Supreme Court's decision have yet to be fully understood or
imagined.
LAURA K. BANCROFT
could not otherwise be compensated.
246. As of the writing of this Note, Gustafson has been cited in only three subsequent
cases: In re Grady, 180 B.R. 461, 464 (E.D. Va. 1995); In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108 (3d.
Cir. 1995); and Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In Grady, the court cited to Gustafson for the proposition that identical words used in
different parts of a statute are intended to have the same meaning. Grady, 180 B.R. at
464. Gustafson was cited for the same proposition in In re Cohn. Cohn, 54 F.3d at
1115. In Komanoff, the court followed Gustafson's holding and dismissed the plaintiffs
§ 12(2) claims for failure to state a cause of action. Komanoff, 884 F. Supp. at 857.
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